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MULTIPLE COMMUNITIES OR MONOLITIIC
CLIENTS: POSITIONAL CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AND THE MISSION OF THE
LEGAL SERVICES LAWYER
Peter Margulies*
INTRODUCTION

Legal services lawyers are not supposed to have conflicts of interest.
Indeed, many legal services lawyers got into that line of work so they
could avoid the hired gun ethos that breeds conflicts. In contrast with
the image of the private practitioner, legal services lawyers typically

do not boast of being able to argue one position and then spin around
to argue the opposite, like some legal Linda Blair.' In place of these

easily-shed commitments held in place by a retainer and hourly billing, legal services lawyers cite a sense of mission.
One can define this mission narrowly as the provision of legal access-access to an attorney for those previously unrepresented. In the
alternative, one can define it more broadly as also entailing social access-access to resources and power for communities previously denied both.2 In considering what clients to serve and what legal
arguments to make on their behalf, legal services lawyers use this
* Professor of Law and Director, Immigration Clinic, St. Thomas University
School of Law. B.A. 1978, Colgate University; J.D. 1981, Columbia Law School. I
am grateful for conversations with Bruce Green, Esther Lardent, and Paul Tremblay.
My experience as a member of the board of directors at Mobilization for Youth
(MFY) Legal Services in New York City, along with the commitment, craft, and battle-scarred irony of its attorneys, informed the conception of the legal services mission
which I offer here.
1. See The Exorcist (Warner Brothers 1973); see also Lawrence Joseph, Lawyerland 74 (1997) (quoting an attorney as observing, "Remember, lawyers are the ones
who invented spin"). While legal services lawyers may "spin" as much as other lawyers in representing a client, they are different from most other attorneys in tying
their advocacy to a vision of legal and social equality.
2. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairnessin Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 338-39 (1978)
(discussing the justifications cited for public interest practice centering on issues of
economic, racial, and social inequality). Invoking this sense of mission need not lead
to a romanticizing of legal services practice. The press of routine may extract much of
the vitality and commitment to a community which brought lawyers to this work. See
Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law
Practice 28 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567,
2598-601 (1993) [hereinafter Alfieri, Impoverished Practices];Clark D. Cunningham,
A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L Rev. 2459,
2470-73 (1989); Marc Feldman, PoliticalLessons: Legal Services for the Poor,83 Geo.
L.J. 1529, 1586-91 (1995); Peter Margulies, The Mother with PoorJudgment and Other
Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal
Education, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 731 (1994); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their
Lives: Recognizing ClientNarrativein Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 505 (1994).
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sense of mission as a guide.' The challenge for legal services lawyers
is that efforts to define the community, or sort out its multiple interests, reveal the dynamic nature of the legal services mission. In addressing what the legal ethics literature commonly calls "positional
conflicts of interest,",4 this Article offers a contextual approach to
meeting that challenge.
The term "positional conflict" means different things to different
lawyers. Technically, it refers only to situations in which a lawyer or
her law firm argues one side of a legal issue in one case, and argues
the opposing side in a different case. This Article calls such conflicts
"doctrinal" conflicts. Many lawyers, however, understand the term to
refer to a much wider category of situations in which making legal or
factual arguments on behalf of one client will potentially offend another. Similarly, in the legal services context, where lawyers often
have a strong sense of mission, we can refer to cases or arguments that
appear to be in tension with that mission as presenting a "mission"
conflict. This distinction between doctrinal and mission conflicts is
helpful in the legal services context only when it is coupled with a
more refined understanding of the meaning of the mission for legal
services lawyers.
There is no shortage of definitions of this mission. The most familiar is the legal access rationale, which I call the "common carrier" conception. Friends and foes of legal services invoke the common carrier
conception as a supposedly "apolitical" justification for legal services.
They argue that this involves merely providing legal representation,
without changing the underlying terms of social access-the allocation
of power and resources in our society. The separation of law and politics contemplated by the common carrier model, however, is easier to
In addition, as this Article notes, a sense of mission may be too monolithic to address
the diversity of community needs over time.
3. The focus on legal and social access dates back at least to the origin of modern
legal services programs in the Great Society initiatives of the Office of Economic
Opportunity. See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights
Movement, 1960-1973, at 32-33 (1993); Louise G. Trubek, U.S. Legal Education and
Legal Services for the Indigent: A Historicaland Personal Perspective, 5 Md. J.Contemp. Legal Issues 381, 384 (1994); cf Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the
Golden Age, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1401, 1402-03 (1995) (reviewing Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (1993)) (noting that
today's legal scholars have shown a renewed interest in the theory and practice of
poverty law).
4. For commentary on this issue in the canons of the profession, see Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. 9 (1998). For views from the literature, see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 90-92 (1978); Robert Eli Rosen,
Devils, Lawyers and Salvation Lie in the Details: Deontological Legal Ethics, Issue
Conflicts of Interest and Civic Education in Law Schools, in Ethical Challenges to
Legal Education and Conduct 61, 63 (Kim Economides ed., 1998); John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 457, 463-69 (1993); Norman W.
Spaulding, Note, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat. PositionalConflicts in Service Pro
Bono Publico, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1395, 1401-06 (1998).
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invoke in rhetoric than to implement in reality. Conservatives, for example, supplement their common carrier rhetoric with a moralistic
model of legal services that denies assistance to those deemed deviant
such as welfare mothers, undocumented immigrants, and public housing tenants accused of drug trafficking. Liberals and progressives take
the opposite tack. They invoke a monolithic model that treats lowincome people as a homogeneous group, characterized by essential
differences with the rich and middle-class. Intra-group differences,
like those manifested by tenants concerned about drugs and crime, do
not appear on the monolithic model radar screen. For advocates of
the monolithic model, offering legal access to this sub-group of tenants conflicts with the legal services mission.5
Where the monolithic model sounds the right chord is in its clear
commitment to both the legal and social kinds of access. This Article
rejects the common carrier approach, with its lofty but expedient
claims to apolitical status. It also rejects the punitive tinge of the moralistic model. In adopting a contextual approach to positional conflicts of interest, it seeks to unite two crucial commitments: first, the
commitment to both legal and social access manifested by the monolithic approach; and second, sensitivity to differences within the diverse community of people living in poverty that the monolithic
model obscures.6 Working through this sensitivity, however, requires
taking seriously the sense of mission articulated by the monolithic
model. This sense of mission has ethical dimensions for legal services
lawyers, even when the conflict of mission addressed may not technically qualify as an "ethical" conflict under the canons of professional
responsibility as traditionally understood.
Part I of this Article outlines the values served by conflicts of interest doctrine, including loyalty, confidentiality, and access. In considering the value of social access, it stresses the importance of developing
community institutions, employing a human capital model of development first suggested by legal services pioneers Edgar and Jean
Camper Cahn. 7 It then examines in greater depth the common carrier, moralistic, and monolithic models of legal services practice, and
concludes with a discussion of the kinds of conflicts that are most challenging in legal services settings: mission conflicts, doctrinal conflicts,
5. The difficulties of addressing such intra-group difference have not gone unnoticed in the literature. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Conununity-Based Ethic for
Legal Services Practice,37 UCLA L. Rev. 1101, 1117-29 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay,
Community-Based Ethic].

6. This Article is part of a larger project, which has previously centered on representing survivors of domestic violence. See Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law. In Search of Access,
Connection, and Voice, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1071, 1100 (1995) [hereinafter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors].

7. See Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interst in Public Interest Law, 79 Yale LI. 1005, 1012-14 (1970).
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and resource conflicts. Part II discusses ways of dealing with these
conflicts based on the extant models of legal services practice. Part III
outlines a contextual approach, which seeks to address the flaws of
each of the other approaches. Part IV applies this approach to mission conflicts, and part V applies it to doctrinal conflicts of interest. In
addressing these issues, the contextual approach seeks to build on the
virtues that have always informed the best legal services theory and
practice.
I.

VALUES, MISSIONS, AND CONFLICTS

This part describes the problems faced by low-income communities
and how conflicts of interest affect those problems. It then explains
the four different visions of the mission of legal services. Finally, it
couples the visions of legal services with the values served by conflict
of interest doctrine.
A.

Values and Conflicts of Interest

The core premise of our system of legal representation is that the
lawyer acts as the agent of the client. In this capacity the lawyer, as
agent, pursues the interest of her client, the principal. Whenever client interests clash, the lawyer's role becomes a study in paradox: the
lawyer becomes a force for the destruction of the client's interests, not
their vindication. It is understandable, then, that the legal profession
should seek to curb such conflicts of interest. The kinds of conflicts of
relevance to legal services attorneys are discussed below; some are
traditionally recognized as such by the legal profession, some are not.8
Prior to such discussion, however, it is useful to outline the core values
served by conflicts of interest doctrine, including countervailing values
that make the restrictions on conflicts less than absolute.
Three values inform the legal profession's view of conflicts of interests: confidentiality, loyalty, and access. Confidentiality dictates that
lawyers should not share information gained from one client with
others, absent the consent of the client imparting the information.
Loyalty mandates that lawyers should not allow feelings of allegiance
to one client to compromise vigorous representation of another. At
the same time, overly-restrictive conflicts rules will, in the name of
confidentiality and loyalty, impair the access of clients to the lawyers
of their choice-which we call legal access. In the case of poverty
lawyers, overly-restrictive conflicts rules will sometimes deprive the
communities these lawyers serve of a broader access to resources and
power-"social" access-which the lawyer could obtain were she not
constrained by a narrower set of allegiances.
8. See infra Part I.C.
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These two kinds of access, legal and social, merit further discussion.
Legal access, the kind that comes most readily to mind when considering the effects of conflicts doctrine, deals with the access of poor people to the justice system and to legal representation? An overly
restrictive conflicts policy deprives poor people of representation if
they are "conflicted out" of being represented by a legal services office, because a legal services program is often the lawyer of first and
last resort in low-income communities. 10
Social access, in contrast, is a less prominent element in traditional
conflicts of interest analysis, because it makes the substantive empowerment of an entire client group or community central to the law office's mission. This focus is shared by many legal services and public
interest law programs, but by only a small percentage of private law
firms, like those representing labor unions or plaintiffs in employment
cases. Social access is access to goods, services, and benefits that can
combat the root causes of subordination, including poverty itself. This
kind of access requires infusions of capital. As noted by Edgar and
Jean Camper Cahn, pioneers of theory and action on legal services,
the capital required is both financial and human in form." While financial capital is crucial, human capital-the investment of time and
effort in education, organization, and institution-building-is also necessary.12 Both kinds of capital need replenishment in the communities

9. See Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Senices and Group Representation,45 Ohio St. L.J. 2, 24-26 (1984).
10. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at 1141 n.142.
11. See Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 Yale Li. 2133, 2133-34
(1995); Cahn & Cahn, supra note 7, at 1016-24; cf.Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics 77 (1985) (noting that the "metaphor" of human capital, popularized
by Gary Becker, refined thought in two areas of economic thought: "'Thought in both
fields was improved-labor economics by recognizing that skills, for all their intangibility, arise from abstention from consumption; capital theory by recognizing that
skills, for all their lack of capitalization, compete with other investments for a claim to
abstention."). In invoking this conception of human capital, I do not slight the concerns of critics of lav and economics that the rhetoric of economics can obscure,
rather than illuminate, important elements of human interaction. See, e.g., Jane B.
Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiquesof Economic
Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 431, 485-90 (1996) (arguing that utilitarian cost-benefit analysis undervalues harms to identity and personhood). The conception of human capital I employ here is not necessarily translatable into dollars and
cents. Instead, it focuses in large part on the intangible images and rituals of solidarity which create community. One element of these images and rituals, however, is
instrumental, or at least purposive-the notion of working together for a common
goal. Frustration in achieving common goals will gradually lead to anomie and
demoralization.
12. See David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow, A Movement Society." Contentious Politics for a New Century, in The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a
New Century 1, 15-18 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998) (discussing the
concept of "social capital," measured by the degree of sustained social activism).
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served by legal services. 13 That replenishment should be a core ele-

ment of the legal services mission.
To begin to understand how to replenish human and financial capital in low-income communities, it is important to appreciate why this
type of capital is in short supply. Sociologists have theorized that the
shortage of both financial and human capital in low-income communities stems from the interaction of macro and micro factors. 14 These
macro factors include racism, classism, and inequitable allocation of
resources.1 " Micro factors include the organizational difficulties confronted by institutions like the church, community-controlled businesses, and the family.16 In many communities served by legal
services, macro and micro factors interact to form a downward spiral.
When resources and capital from the larger society are not forthcoming, the arduous personal investment in human capital such as education seems like a sucker's bet to many in the community, particularly
young people. Rather than invest time and effort building institutions
that benefit the community in the long term, too many young people
fall back on activities that pay off in the short term, including drugs

and crime.17 "Mentoring" relationships form in those contexts, not in
the context of productive social institutions. These concerted activities, which largely victimize other members of the community, further
weaken the community's fragile institutional fabric. In a vicious cycle,
the "social disorganization"' 8 which results from this downward spiral
of macro and micro disinvestment offers a pat rationale for continued
13. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy
and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78
Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1128-34 (1992) (examining the obligations of lawyers in representing
community organizations).
14. See John Hagan, Crime and Disrepute 66-77 (1994); Robert J. Sampson & W.
Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-DisorganizationTheory, 94 Am. J. Soc. 774, 774-800 (1989).
15. See Sampson & Groves, supra note 14, at 780-82.
16. Domestic violence is a good example of a social problem with macro and
micro elements that impedes the development of human capital. Domestic violence
hinders women from getting and keeping jobs, as men exercise power and control by
prohibiting work by their partners, or harassing partners on the job. This kind of
violence affects women and families on an individual basis, but stems from a spectrum
of causes, including the pervasive power of patriarchal assumptions of privilege, as
well as the effects in low-income communities of frustrations produced by lack of
opportunity. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater,Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1003, 1034-44; Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 1241, 1245-51 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 590-94 (1990).
17. See Hagan, supra note 14, at 82.
18. See Sampson & Groves, supra note 14, at 777-82. My focus here is on the
relationship between drugs and violent crime on the one hand, and both micro and
macro investments in human capital on the other. As Regina Austin has pointed out,
some activities that are illegal or on the margins of legality, such as street-peddling,
can become positive elements in community life. See Regina Austin, "The Black Con-
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inequitable allocations of resources by bolstering arguments that more
equitable resource allocations are either futile or counter-productive.19 This does not mean that a punitive approach is the best approach to solving this problem, as conservatives suggest.20 It does
mean, however, that addressing the problem is an important element
of the social access mission of legal services.
B. Models of Legal Services
We filter concerns about social access through four distinct visions
of the mission of legal services. These are, first, the "common carrier"
vision; second, the conservative "moralistic" vision; third, the progressive "monolithic" vision; and fourth, the contextual vision. These perspectives differ in how they define the mission of legal services, and
how they treat differences within groups, and between groups.
1. Common Carrier Vision
Consider first the common carrier model, which stresses providing
legal, as opposed to social, access to poor people. It suggests that
legal services offices are a bit like the phone company. They must
provide services to everyone, without regard to the goals of those
seeking the services or consideration of whether those goals fit into
any substantive vision of the goals of legal services. The basic limitation on internal access, as with many phone systems, is that a queue is
set up in which those first in time receive services before those who
sought access later.
A substantive or political agenda, according to this view, impermissibly ranks prospective clients on substantive grounds. Conservatives
who have made an avocation of attacking legal services have argued
that priority-setting is illegitimate because it involves policy-making
by unelected usurpers of the silent majority's will, in much the same
munity," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, in After Identity: A Reader

in Law and Culture 143, 150-51 (Dan Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
19. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility,
Jeopardy 137-38 (1991) (discussing the work of Charles Murray).

20. For both a description and a persuasive rejection of the conservative approach
from a human and social capital perspective, see Tracey L.Meares, ChartingRace and
Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for FederalCriminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L Rev. 137, 140 (1997) (analyzing "dual

frustration" in the African-American community about both high rates of crime and
bias in the criminal justice system); and Tracey L Meares, Place and Crime, 73 Chi.-

Kent L. Rev. 669, 701-04 (1998) [hereinafter Mears, Place and Crime] (arguing for
community-police partnership such as with the black church). Cf Kimberly E.
O'Leary, Dialogue, Perspective,and Point of View as Lawyering Method: A New Approach to EvaluatingAnti-Crime Measures in Subsidized Housing, 49 J. Urb. & Con-

temp. L. 133, 167-88 (1996) (discussing overlapping, as well as conflicting, interests of
tenants and law enforcement authorities).
21. See Marshall J. Breger, Disqualificationfor Conflicts of Interest and the Legal
Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1115, 1123-24 (1982).
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vein that activist judging, according to conservatives, creates the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty." 22 Picking and choosing between
constituencies, including the decision to represent poor tenants but
not poor landlords (like those renting out a room or a single apartment in a their own residence), is a good example of what would not
be permissible under the common carrier model. This attack on the
legitimacy of legal services has led to the current evisceration of federally-funded legal services, not only in financial terms, but also in substantive limitations on the kind of litigation federally-funded
programs can undertake, barring, for example, most class actions and
challenges to "welfare reform" measures.23
Yet, as a number of commentators have noted, this apolitical vision
is basically an optical illusion. Everyone sooner or later returns to
some kind of political conception of legal services.24 Conservatives
adopt a "moralistic" view, which seeks to enforce their own restrictive
conception of morality through statutory limits on whom legal services
offices can represent. Many advocates of legal services adopt a "monolithic" view, which seeks to implement a one-dimensional view of
social access through more informal limits on representation. The
moralistic and monolithic visions have opposite views of class differences-differences within the class of people living in poverty, and
differences between this group, the rich, and the middle class. I depict
these opposing views in the chart below, and analyze them in the text.
How Two

MODELS OF LEGAL SERVICES ADDRESS DIFFERENCE

Intra-Group
Difference

Inter-Group
Difference

Conservative
Moralistic Approach

Exaggerate

Obscure

Progressive
Monolithic Approach

Obscure

Exaggerate

22. See the remarks of the always-reliable Howard Phillips, who described legal
services in the 1970s as fulfilling a "radical social and political agenda," planned and
executed by "avowed Marxists" in legal services programs. See David Luban, Lawyers
And Justice: An Ethical Study 299 (1988) (quoting the letter to conservatives sent by
the "National Defeat Legal Services Committee," signed by Howard Phillips).
23. See generally Jessica A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional
Challenge to the 1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation,33 Harv. C.R.C.L. Rev. 107, 126 (1998) (discussing the free speech basis for constitutional challenges to LSC restrictions).
24. Under the surface, the "common carrier" approach sets a mission tacitly, by
upholding the distribution of power and resources characteristic of the status quo. Cf.
Luban, supra note 22, at 306-10 (noting contradictions manifested by what Luban
calls "equal access" arguments); Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at
1132-33 (same).
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2. Moralistic Vision
The moralistic vision requires that legal services offices refrain from
representing people challenging the conservative agenda,2 an agenda
that conservatives argue embodies morality as we know it. As a result, the Republican Congress has tried to bar legal services offices
from representing undocumented immigrants, welfare recipients challenging welfare reform, or tenants challenging evictions based on their

alleged drug use.2 6 The moralistic view makes two moves with regard
to group differences. It exaggerates differences within groups and it
obscures differences between groups.

The moralistic view exaggerates differences among people living in
poverty by insisting that one essential difference splits this groupsome people are law-abiding, while others are not. 7 Conservatives
are eager to label people as belonging to one camp. The actual and
figurative familial ties that bind people in each camp, as well as others
who bridge the camps, 2s are ignored in this account. At the same
time, with its faith in formal equality-the notion that everyone, rich
or poor, regardless of inequities in resource distribution, has an equal
opportunity to succeed-the moralistic view downplays the importance of resource disparities in determining life chances. In this sense,
the moralistic account obscures inter-group differences that resource
disparities help create.
25. In this sense the moralistic agenda, like the common carrier agenda, is wary of
the counter-majoritarian difficulty precipitated by going to law.
26. See, e.g., Legal Services Corporation: Hearing Before the SubcoMnm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 104th Cong. 36 (1996) (statement of Kenneth F. Boehm,
Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center) (discussing drug-related eviction cases).
For discussions of this conservative trend, see Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan,
Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare "Reform", 26 U. Mich. J.L Reform 741,
741 (1993); Berta Esperanza Hemnndez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights,
Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An IternationalHunan Rights Critiqueof Immigration and Welfare "Reform", 71 S.Cal. L. Rev. 547, 549-52 (1998); and Lucie E. White,
On the "Consensus" to End Welfare: Where are the Women's Voices?, 26 Conn. L
Rev. 843, 843-44 (1994).
27. See Austin, supra note 18, at 145-46. Austin, in criticizing this moralistic perspective, rejects the "politics of distinction" between worthy and unworthy members
of the community urged by Randall Kennedy, who focuses on African-American victims of crime while discounting many, although not all, concerns about racial bias in
the criminal justice system. See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 19-21
(1997); see also Meares, Placeand Crime, supra note 20, at 677-78 (arguing that Kennedy's views are overly simplistic); Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common
Ground, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1306, 1306-07 (1998) (reviewing Randall Kennedy, Race,
Crime, and the Law (1997)) (same); cf.Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 Rutgers L Rev. 45, 46-52
(1998) [hereinafter Margulies, Identity on Trial] (discussing where and how to take
racial, class, and gender subordination into account in criminal justice); Peter Margulies, The Identity Question, Madeleine Albright's Past, and Me: Insights from Jewish
and African-American Law and Literature, 17 Loy. LA. Ent. L.J. 595, 619-22 (1997)
[hereinafter Margulies, The Identity Question] (analyzing debates about Black-onBlack crime).
28. See Margulies, The Identity Question, supra note 27, at 616-22.
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While conservatives pursue a moralistic agenda to justify restrictions on legal services practice, some progressives echo this approach
in justifying their own views. We can isolate two strands of progressive thought on the mission of legal services: the monolithic view and
the contextual view.
3.

Monolithic Vision

The monolithic view inverts the moralistic take on class difference.
It obscures differences among people living in poverty while heightening differences between this group and others.2 9 Under the monolithic view, differences among people living in poverty, and
commonalities between the poor, the rich, and the middle classes, are
invisible.3 ° In extreme versions, this view suggests that providing representation in cases where both parties are living in poverty, such as
domestic relations or domestic violence work, is a perversion of the
legal services mission at worst, and a futile "intraclass transfer of resources" at best.31 This view is also skeptical of ever representing anyone outside of the community hypothesized by the commentators,
such as a landlord, even when the landlord: (1) is either a poor person
herself, such as someone who sublets a room in a small apartment, or
a non-profit organization; and (2) takes a position that dovetails with
the wishes and interests of many of her tenants, such as seeking to
evict a tenant who has victimized other tenants. The result is an unduly narrow conception of the mission of the legal services lawyer,
29. For a candid assessment of this proclivity from an academic on the Left, see
William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469, 478
(1984) ("Activists... sometimes spoke in connection with the War on Poverty or the
legal services program of the urban low income 'community' . . . as if it were a fully
constituted entity with determinate, articulated, unitary interests."). Cf Anthony V.
Alfieri, Disabled Clients, DisablingLawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769, 834 (1992) (describing the client base of disability lawyers as "diverse"). Conservatives, as well, do not
hesitate to point out this monolithic tone in some progressive views of legal services.
See Breger, supra note 21, at 1126 (criticizing the monolithic view of legal services
case selection on the grounds that "[t]he heterogeneity of interests among eligible
clients reflects the rich diversity of cultural and ethnic life in America"). The vulnerability of the conservative position, as noted above, is that conservatives also do not
hesitate to jettison the common carrier model when it would require them to represent clients, like tenants accused of drug trafficking, whom they deem beyond the
moral pale.
30. One can argue that this is an essentialist account of class difference, while
agreeing that people living in poverty have both some interests in common, and some
interests that are distinct from those of other classes. The contextual view, which I
outline below, seeks not to obscure or exaggerate such differences, as do the moralistic and monolithic visions, but to acknowledge and address them. For a more
nuanced account of common interests among people living in poverty, see Tremblay,
Community-Based Ethic,supra note 5, at 1133 ("[T]he clients in fact are a community,
in the sense of demonstrating similar needs and interests over time."). Tremblay acknowledges that such clients may not "share experiences," and "may disagree that
they 'belong' to [the] poverty 'community."' Id.
31. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 474, 609 (1985).
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and an incomplete view of social access that neglects human capital
formation within low-income communities.
4. Contextual Vision
In contrast, consider the contextual view. 32 The contextual view,
unlike the moralistic and monolithic views, acknowledges both intragroup difference and inter-group commonality. According to this
view, being engaged in a community means immersing oneself in a
multiplicity of perspectives. No one category, be it class, legal position (landlord or tenant, merchant or consumer), gender, race, or disability status, either exhausts or wholly determines the range of human
action and interest. While acknowledging the role of each of these
factors, the contextual approach recognizes that local situations each
have a dynamic that frustrates "preconceived categories, 3 3 with the
factors noted above, as well as others, interacting in contingent and
unpredictable ways.3 4 The most vital social movements have always
found commonalities beyond these facile rubrics.35 Yet this very contingency creates other imperatives for law and politics. Because we
cannot always determine people's goals in advance by categorizing
them as tenants, landlords, or the like,3 6 we need to provide space
where people can organize and speak. In this space, people whom
society has treated as invisible and inaudible appear and articulate
critics of legal services practice
their concerns to others. Progressive 37
"voice."
spaces
such
in
goes
what
call
When we couple such a concept with some vision of personal and
community development, we get closer to the conception of human
capital discussed above. Of course, various kinds of violence can
32. For examples of the contextual view of lawyering, see Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 6, at 1092-1103; and David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 814-19 (1992). For an approach that emphasizes context over rigid categories in clinical legal education, see
David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Paradigmfor Crisper Lawvering, 4
Clinical L. Rev. 163, 179-83 (1997).
33. See Dana R. Villa, The Philosopher Versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and
Socrates, 26 Pol. Theory 147, 155 (1998) (quoting Hannah Arendt, Understandingand
Politics, in Essays In Understanding 307, 321 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994)).
34. Albert Hirschman puts this incisively: "The architect of social change can
never have a reliable blueprint. Not only is each house he builds different from any
other that was built before, but it also necessarily uses new construction materials and
even experiments with untested principles of stress and structure." See Donald N.
McCloskey, If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise 82 (1990)
(quoting Albert 0. Hirschman, The Seardz for Paradigmsas a Hindrance to Understanding, in Interpretive Social Science: A Reader 163, 179 (P. Rabinow & W.M.
Sullivan eds., 1979)).
35. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 218-19 (1958) (describing the genesis of the labor movement).
36. In this sense, Arendt's and Hirschman's views share common ground with
postmodemists. See, eg., Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 Va. L Rev. 721,
727-29 (1996) (articulating the post-modem perspective on power and subordination).
37. See Alfieri, Impoverished Practices,supra note 2, at 2643.
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quash the development of voice and human capital, including the violence of inequitable allocation of resources; professional overreaching;38 crime and police brutality, with their inculcation of demoralizing
fear;3 9 drugs, with both their link to violence and magnification of
short-term sensation over long-term well being;4" and the frenzy of
acquisition, which makes us all-rich, poor, and middle-class-discount human interaction and exalt the accumulation of things.
Although random or self-destructive violence is a liability to the development of both voice and human capital, conflict about community
mission and how to pursue it is not only inevitable but desirable for
the legal services attorney.4 Otherwise, the attorney is not engaged
in the context of the community, but is using abstract constructs like
"tenants" or "consumers" to avoid grappling with diversity.
Under the contextual view, formulating the legal services office's
mission as serving the interests of tenants does not necessarily require
representing any tenants or only tenants. The contextual view is in
accord with the monolithic view, and opposed to the common carrier
view, in arguing that routinely representing landlords seeking eviction,
particularly on grounds of nonpayment of rent, constitutes a mission
conflict.42 The contextual view also differs from the common carrier
model, and perhaps the monolithic model as well, in holding that
some tenants, particularly those who credible evidence suggests victimize other tenants or traffic in drugs, will not be appropriate clients
in light of this mission. The contextual view also differs from the monolithic view in holding that some landlords, such as community
groups, may be appropriate clients when they seek eviction of tenants
who victimize other tenants.
38. See id. at 2590-96; see also Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an
Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1182 & n.35

(1992) (discussing the arrogance of education professionals in dealing with issues involving children with disabilities); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41, 72-73 (1979)
(arguing for greater client participation in the development of legal strategy and
arguments).
39. See Meares, Place and Crime, supra note 20, at 671.
40. The great jazz trumpeter Miles Davis, who kicked the heroin habit after a
relatively short period of addiction in his twenties, starkly describes the influence of
drugs:
Shooting heroin changed my whole personality from being a nice, quiet,
honest, caring person into someone who was the complete opposite. It was
the drive to get the heroin that made me that way. I'd do anything not to be
sick, which meant getting and shooting heroin all the time, all day and all
night.
Miles Davis with Quincy Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography 136 (1989).
41. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Social Conflicts as Pillarsof DemocraticMarket Society, 22 Pol. Theory 203, 206-07 (1994).
42. Cf. David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the FirstAmendment. Should a Black
Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1030, 1060-64 (1995)
(arguing that a black lawyer cannot simultaneously represent the NAACP and the
KKK).
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Proponents of the contextual view, however, must also take care
that they do not slide into a kinder, gentler version of the moralistic
view. A legal services office, therefore, has an obligation to fight evictions based on what it believes to be hasty or unfounded allegations of
violence or drug trafficking, and to contest any proposed procedure
that would permit evictions on such a summary basis. Such vigilance
is an important vehicle for resisting the racism and classism that undergird public demands for such procedures, and which sabotages social access. While other tenants may be willing, out of desperation, to
tolerate such truncations of procedural rights, the views of other tenants should not be dispositive here.43 The tenants' desperation may
be a kind of short-term reaction that frustrates the long-term goal of
human capital development, and unduly discounts the long-term importance of procedural rights to community stability. The other tenants' views may also represent a moralistic "politics of distinction""
that exaggerates differences between members of the community, too
glibly separating worthy from unworthy. A lawyer who takes community stability as her goal has an obligation to resist such hasty judgments. For the contextual lawyer, then, there are no easy answers to
questions about whom the legal services office should represent. Answers necessarily will vary with the situation "on the ground."
C. Types of Conflicts in Legal Services Offices
Our goal here is to see how the visions of legal services described
above fare when coupled with the values identified in part I.A. To
facilitate this analysis, we also need to identify the kinds of conflicts,
not all of which necessarily have the same degree of ethical import,
which arise in legal services practice: client conflicts; positional conflicts, which I divide into mission and doctrinal conflicts; and resource
conflicts.
In a client conflict, a lawyer represents one client, while the same
lawyer, or another lawyer with the same firm, represents another client on the opposite side of a case or transaction from the first client.
The threat to the duties of confidentiality and loyalty are clear. Intentionally or inadvertently, confidential information from one client may
end up being disclosed to the other, or being used against the first. At
the same time, because of financial or other incentives, the lawyer
may soft-pedal her representation of one client to appease the other.
43. In this respect, I argue, David Luban defers too readily to the perceived vill
of

the community majority. See Luban, supra note 22, at 339-40 (arguing that the lawyer's acquiescence in such rights violations is permissible if the community's representatives agree); cf.Spence v. Reeder, 416 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1981) (holding that an
agreement drafted by a legal services office providing for summary evictions was void
because it violated state statutory rights and tenants at risk of eviction were not adequately represented by the office).

44. See Austin, supra note 18, at 145.
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While some courts have allowed access concerns to influence consideration of the appropriate remedy here, particularly where the law
firm did not create the conflict, typically the remedy here is disqualification of the lawyer and, on an imputed basis, the lawyer's entire firm.
The next kind of conflict is the positional conflict. Here, some care
is useful in defining terms. The broad view of positional conflicts suggests that such a conflict occurs whenever the law office takes a case
involving a client or position that, without being directly adverse to an
existing or former client, may create some tension with existing clients, be offensive to those clients, or run counter to the culture of
representation in the law office.45 Law firms have traditionally invoked such concerns to avoid doing work, pro bono or otherwise, involving consumer law, environmental law, or plaintiff's securities law,
on the theory that such work may embarrass paying corporate clients.4 6 Legal services offices have refused representation to some
groups based on a similarly broad view of positional conflicts. 47 Most
legal services offices declined to represent landlords, even small landlords who met legal services income eligibility guidelines, despite
some pressure from conservatives invoking the common carrier
model.48 In the family law parental rights area, some offices only represent children, while others only represent parents. While we may
view the law firm's refusal as a business decision in ethics clothing, in
the legal services setting it seems reasonably clear that a reluctance to
represent certain client groups, such as landlords, stems from a definition of the "mission" of legal services.
If one adopts a monolithic view of the legal services mission, it is
easy to conclude that representing a landlord in an eviction proceeding, regardless of the community ties of the landlord or the conduct of
the tenant, is beyond the pale. The theory behind this decision is indeed compelling in many instances. The tenant will almost always be
the party with less wealth and power in such a contest, although the
question may be a closer one if the landlord is a senior citizen on a
fixed income who owns a modest home and has sublet a room. The
attorney can argue further that stability in housing is a fundamental
need and right that legal services lawyers must struggle to preserve. 49
45. For a comparison of the broad and more narrow views of positional conflicts,
see Spaulding, supra note 4, at 1395-99.
46. See Breger, supra note 21, at 1135 n.90; Spaulding, supra note 4, at 1415.
47. See Breger, supra note 21, at 1134-35.
48. Id.
49. One can make similarly compelling arguments about representing parents in
parental rights proceedings. Stability is crucial to the family, and parental rights are
among the most cherished and basic in our society. Furthermore, parents, particularly
poor parents, are a substantially underrepresented group in parental rights proceedings, while children often have better representation, often from non-profit or appointed private counsel whose moralistic default position may be favoring the
removal of the child from her parents. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determining the Roles of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399, 1420 (1996).
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In some cases, however, this rationale is undercut. A tenant who victimizes other tenants also threatens stability in housing. Indeed, sufficiently egregious behavior can amount to a kind of constructive
eviction of other tenants. These difficult cases suggest that the monolithic view is too quick to discern mission conflicts, at the price of ignoring context.
The other kind of positional conflict is the doctrinal conflict. Here,
a lawyer argues a legal, not factual, position on behalf of one client
that is inconsistent with a legal position argued simultaneously in another case. Here, too, law firms and legal services offices have sometimes wanted to broaden the definition, while conservatives seeking
control over legal services priority-setting have sought to limit it. The
ethical implications of this kind of conflict have been recognized only
fairly recently. The comments to the Model Rules address the issue,
although the rules themselves are largely silent. Local bar associations have been more active. The Model Rules' comments' position is
a fairly narrow one, namely, that lawyers and their firms should not
simultaneously argue inconsistent doctrinal positions in the same
court in the same jurisdiction. 0 The chief value served by this rule
seems to be loyalty-not only loyalty defined by the lawyer's efforts
on the client's behalf, but loyalty defined by the attitudes that the lawyer's inconsistency may engender among third-party decisionmakers,
such as courts, confused by the clash in the lawyer's positions. Yet,
these loyalty concerns seem most salient when: (1) the conflict is personal to a particular attorney, not imputed to her entire firm or office;
and (2) the law office has a financial incentive to soft-pedal arguments
on one side of the issue.51
When these factors are not present, it seems more difficult to justify
the restrictions on legal and social access imposed by a broad reading
of doctrinal conflicts.5 2 A broad reading hinders legal access by depriving a client who wishes to press a particular cause with the lawyer
of her choice. It also hinders social access if it prematurely classifies a
doctrinal dispute as a zero-sum game, instead of a process of dialogue
between different community members which can lead to growth,
change, and mutually beneficial results. A hasty determination that a
doctrinal conflict exists thus impedes the development of democratic
50. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. (1998).
51. Confidentiality may also be a concern in particular cases. See Dzienkovski,
supra note 4, at 522. Absent financial incentives, however, screening devices should
be adequate to address this problem.
52. Here, as with mission conflicts, legal and social access often go together. See

also Simon, supra note 29, at 490-501 (criticizing rigid distinctions between working
inside and outside of the system); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Internal/ErternalDistinction and the Notion of a "Practice" in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 L &
Soe'y Rev. 163, 176-80 (1996) (arguing that the conception of a practice as both mak-

ing and reflecting meaning helps bridge the gap between external and internal
perspectives).
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decisionmaking. This is particularly true because a viewpoint not represented by a legal services office may struggle vainly to acquire other
advocacy resources. By silencing intra-group difference, a broad reading of doctrinal conflicts hampers the reframing of issues, freezing old
dichotomies and frustrating the serendipitous discovery of common
ground.
The fourth conflict, which is rarely considered ethical per se, but
may be the one most relevant to legal services practice, is the resource
conflict. By the term resource conflict, I refer not so much to the conflict between client groups embodied in the conception of mission
conflict, but to the conflict about how to meet the needs of a given
client group in a situation of resource scarcity. Resource conflicts
were one focus for the early theorizing about legal services and human
capital. Edgar and Jean Camper Cahn, for example, wrote early on
that public interest law had to be about not only legal consumption,
but also legal investment. 3 That is, providing legal services on a
''common carrier" basis to individual clients was not alone a strategy
for promoting the access that the Cahns identified as vital.5 4 Getting a
lawyer, without more, would keep subordinated people in a reactive
role, only this time with a lawyer to protect them and serve as at least
a modest buffer from, or perhaps a fig leaf for, the depredations of the
powerful.5 5 Instead, social access, which would give subordinated
people a more proactive role in the decisions about power within both
their communities and society as a whole, was vital. 6 Communities of
people living in poverty had to, according to the Cahns, "invest" legal
resources in this kind of external access, and not merely expend those
resources on servicing reactively. 7
What the Cahns recognized was that resource scarcity necessitates
making difficult choices about the most effective way to help the largest number of people. In the classic example, doing law reform or
impact work can help many members of, say, the tenant client group.
The lawyers who established the warranty of habitability gave many
current and future tenants a defense against eviction, where much less
in the way of defenses had previously been available. The lawyer's
time spent on class actions and law reform is an investment of human
capital, which requires abstaining from helping people who are being
evicted right now, as the law reform suit winds its way through the
courts. 58 For conservatives, this loss of resources for service, as op53. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 7, at 1013-14.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 1024.
id.
id. at 1012-14.

58. The Cahns bluntly criticized law offices with a predominantly service caseload
as "cater[ing] to present needs, present demands, immediate gratification and immediate consumption." See id. at 1013.
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posed to impact work, represents a deprivation of access to legal services, in contravention of the common carrier model. 59
As we have seen, however, for legal services lawyers, access has a
broader meaning. The kind of legal access that the conservatives
stress means for legal services lawyers not only access to individual
case representation, but also access to the law reform machinery that
monied clients, such as large corporations, employ.' In addition,
legal services offices rely on the social conception of access-access to
goods, services, and institutions-that may be better served by law
reform, class action, or community-organizing work in some
situations.
Because the contextual vision shares with the monolithic vision this
part of the formulation of both legal and social access, it is sympathetic to the difficult choices legal services offices make in resolving
resource conflicts. The contextual view also recognizes that the results
of those difficult choices, which often involve the law office's declining
to prevent evictions, repossessions, or benefit cut-offs, are not radically different from the results of a less monolithic, more contextual
approach to mission conflicts, which might lead the law office to seek
the eviction of a tenant who was victimizing other tenants. In this
respect, both the monolithic and contextual vision make hard choices
to promote legal and social access.

II.

CONSEQUENCES OF APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS

Exploring how lawyers' values and models of legal services interact
in the conflicts of interest arena is important because these difficult
choices have profound consequences. Focusing on mission and doctrinal conflicts, this part considers those consequences for the communities served by legal services programs.
The monolithic approach resolves conflicts by magnifying intergroup differences, while minimizing intra-group differences. Consider
a law office which says, "We only represent tenants (as opposed to
59. The conservatives' position is at odds with other cornerstones of traditional
conservative rhetoric, which celebrate the rigor of investment and savings over the
undisciplined orgy of consumption. See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory
of Employment Interest and Money 128-31 (1935) (critiquing the traditional conservative view that governmental deficit spending was pernicious because it encouraged consumption while hindering investment). The inconsistency becomes more
acute as one realizes that it is itself a product of the moralist vision of conservatives,
which views investment as being desirable for those who are already wealthy, but
threatening if it involves mobilization by the poor.
60. By suppressing this kind of systemic legal access through curbs on law reform
litigation, class actions, and lobbying, conservatives of a moralistic bent also obscure
inter-group differences. If people living in poverty lack the legal resources to challenge systemic inequality, conservatives can more readily assert that such inequality
does not really exist.
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or "We only represent parents, not children." While

there are persuasive arguments for both positions, there are also costs
for the goals of legal and social access.6'

One kind of cost stems from the exaggeration of inter-group differences characteristic of the monolithic approach. Exaggerating intergroup differences narrows the repertoire of options available to resolve disputes. By demonizing the opposing party, it skews dispute

resolution toward an adversarial approach, instead of using adversarial strategies as only one important element in a dispute resolution
repertoire.6 3 Monolithic decisions about who to represent further

skew proceedings toward an adversarial mode by eliminating representation options for the opposite party. For example, if offices decline to represent children, that representation may be provided by
lawyers who assume a moralistic stance and favor removal of children
61. Another less stark way to resolve these conflicts is to adapt a "functional"
view. This view, which may capture the practice of many legal services offices, is to
pursue different functions for different client groups, avoiding performing the same
function for groups which may end up in opposition. For example, a legal services
office will do transactional work for community development groups, but will avoid
litigation, which might place it at odds with the interests of tenants, who live in community development housing, or consumers, who purchase the products of community businesses. See generally Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community
Economic Development: TransactionalLawyering for Social Change and Economic
Justice. 4 Clinical L. Rev. 195 (1997) (discussing the importance of economic development work to social access). The functional approach is a safe approach to conflicts
issues. This Article argues, however, that a purely functional approach does not do
justice to intra-group diversity in low-income communities.
62. My own conversations with clinical teachers in the family law area suggest that
for many, though not all, an exclusive focus on representing parents is less a reaction
to a perceived mission conflict, and more a pragmatic decision. Pragmatic reasons for
focusing on representing parents include the degree of underrepresentation of parents, and the difficulties associated with teaching law students about the lawyering
role through the representation of children in parental rights cases, where the temptation to make decisions for the client as a kind of de facto guardian is very strong. See
Telephone Interviews with Martin Guggenheim, New York University School of Law
(1997-1998); Guggenheim, supra note 49, at 1408; Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as
Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473, 1485-94
(1996) (offering contextual model for representation of children); see also Joan L.
O'Sullivan et al., Ethical Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 Clinical L. Rev. 109, 130-32 (1996) (detailing the pull of paternalism and moralism in representation of a teenager); cf Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.14 (1995) (stating that a lawyer should presume that a client possesses the requisite
decisionmaking capacity to direct the course of representation upon receipt of the
lawyer's advice); Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301, 1312-13 (1996) (applying the
same analysis in the representation of a child). To the degree that this view is itself
more contextual than monolithic, it is less susceptible to the criticisms offered here.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; cf Peggy C. Davis, Law and Lawyering: Legal Studies with an Interactive Focus, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 185, 187-89
(1992) (discussing lawyering styles); Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L.
Rev. 863, 863-64 (1987) (discussing approaches to negotiation).
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from the family, instead of by lawyers who see the issue in a more
contextual fashion.
The second kind of cost of the monolithic approach stems from its
obscuring of intra-group differences. As we noted earlier, social access reflects the interaction of macro-processes of resource allocation
throughout society, and reflects micro-processes of community organization and human capital formation. The monolithic approach's obscuring of intra-group differences has led to a neglect of these microprocesses by legal services.
Consider the case of housing, where the disinvestment of finance
and human capital in communities served by legal services has had
devastating consequences. Housing, for any community, represents
not just a physical structure, but a haven of belonging, commitment,
and memory. 6 Tragically, the disinvestment of both financial and
human capital has threatened this larger role of housing.' Here, as
elsewhere, legal services and public interest lawyers have paid attention to the macro issues of resource allocation, while paying less mind
to micro issues of human capital. On the macro side, public interest
lawyers have litigated vigorously against the segregation of low-income housing in low-income communities. This economic segregation66 has deprived young people not only of economic opportunity,
but also of concrete examples of the value of investment in education
and other sources of human capital. Lawyers for poor people, however, including legal services lawyers, have done much less to deal
with the micro issues. The concerted activities of drug trafficking and
violent crime have made much housing for poor people, including
public housing in cities like Chicago,67 into a place of perl rather than
a haven. The violence of the drug trade destroys the space residents
require to assemble without fear-to get out of their residences, discuss neighborhood and national politics, and organize.6 The effect of
64. See bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics 41-49 (1990)

(discussing "homeplace" as a source of strength in subordinated communities); John

0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at
the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 Fordham L Rev. 1927, 1951 (1999)

(same).

65. For a discussion of how the overall environment in some public housing
projects, including the physical environment, contributes to crime, instability, and the
decline of community institutions, see Rebekah L. Coley et al., Where Does Community Grow? The Social Context Createdby Nature in Urban Public Housing, 29 Env't
& Behav. 468, 488-90 (1997); cf. Pam Belluck, Razing the Slums to Rescue the Residents, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1998, at Al (reporting that a mother did not allow her
children to play outside her apartment "because gang violence made even hallways
dangerous").
66. See Hagan, supra note 14, at 71-72.
67. See Belluck, supra note 65.
68. See Peter Dreier & John Atlas, U.S. Housing Policy at the Crossroads: Rebuilding the Housing Constituency, 18 J. Urb. Aff. 341, 355, 363 (1996); John Goering
et al., Recent Research on Racial Segregation and Poverty Concentration in Public
Housing in the United States, 32 Urb. Aft. Rev. 723, 741 (1997). As noted, the issue of
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this shrinking of the public sphere may not be as dramatic as the eviction of a 69family from housing altogether, but is in some ways more
insidious.

The above discussion suggests that the monolithic approach to positional conflicts does not fully serve the goal of promoting legal and
social access for low-income communities. The moralistic and common carrier models do far worse. While the monolithic model obscures class differences, the moralistic model exaggerates them, by
barring representation to prospective clients merely accused of being
unworthy. In addition, while the monolithic model neglects the adverse effects of drugs and violence on micro-processes of community
self-government, the moralistic model neglects macro issues of resource allocation. The common carrier model focuses on legal access,
but has little room for either a macro or micro account of social access. We turn, then, to the possibilities afforded by the contextual

model.

drugs and public housing has been most prominent in Chicago. See Peter Kendall &
Terry Wilson, In CHA Homes, Hope Wears Thin: FamiliesAre Left to Adapt to the
Decay, Chi. Trib., June 4, 1995, at 1. The dire situation in Chicago led to proposals for
warrantless searches of housing project apartments, and helped set the stage for a
federal takeover of the Housing Authority. Although residents of public housing in
Chicago supported the goal of drug-free public housing purportedly served by these
measures, residents also were wary of "top-down" measures like the federal takeover,
which proceeded with little input from the residents themselves. See Larry Bennett,
Do We Really Wish to Live in a CommunitarianCity?: Communitarian Thinking and
the Redevelopment of Chicago's Cabrini-Green Public Housing Complex, 20 J. Urb.
Aff. 99, 112-13 (1998). Legal services, as an institution charged with representing tenants in public housing, could have filled that void, arguing both for a proactive drug
policy and for protections of tenants' rights. For example, legal services could have
filed nuisance suits against drug traffickers who made sidewalks, hallways, and stairwells places of peril for other tenants, and could have sought orders of protection
prohibiting drug traffickers from congregating near other tenants on the public housing property. Instead, legal services offices concentrated virtually exclusively on representing tenants accused of drug trafficking, leaving the formation and
implementation of drug policy to more conservative forces who acted without community input.
69. Cf. Luban, supra note 22, at 339 (arguing that lawyers considering whether or
not to challenge summary eviction procedures for violent tenants should consider the
advice of their client or constituency group on "the problems posed by violence in
public housing"). Legal services offices have sometimes recognized this concern.
That is why Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) negotiated with representatives of
the Boston Housing Authority to formulate summary eviction procedures for tenants
charged with violence. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at 1126
n.91. When a tenant subject to the new procedure challenged it, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that his interests had not been adequately represented
by GBLS. See Spence v. Reeder, 416 N.E.2d 914, 921 (Mass. 1981); see also infra notes
98-101 and accompanying text (discussing Spence).
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CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
LEGAL SERVICES

The contextual approach, with its commitments to the interaction of
macro and micro factors, as well as the mission of legal and social
access, is tailored to the evolving challenges facing legal services. It
permits the representation of clients, such as community non-profit
landlords in eviction cases, that the monolithic model would reject on
mission conflict grounds. At the same time, the contextual approach
argues that the indifference of the canons of the profession to mission
conflicts7' unduly discounts the importance of this issue to sociallycommitted legal services lawyers. The contextual approach argues,
moreover, that as cutbacks in Legal Services Corporation funding
spur cultivation of more diverse funding sources, analysis of conflicts
of interest in legal services should address the impact of financial incentives on attorneys' duty of loyalty. To accomplish these goals, the
contextual approach relies on the following factors.
A.

Acuteness of Conflict in Mission or Doctrine

The first question for either mission or doctrine conflicts is whether
the conflict is acute. An acute conflict is one in which the representation of two different client groups (in the case of a mission conflict), or
the advocacy of two different legal arguments (in the case of a doctrinal conflict), constitutes a zero-sum game, such that a gain to one client or cause inevitably causes harm to another. If this harm is not
inevitable, and the lawyer can harmonize client interests, the conflict
is not acute.
B. Asymmetrical FinancialIncentives
If the conflict is determined to be acute, further inquiry is needed.
Asymmetrical financial incentives are the first factor that will trigger a
disqualifying conflict of interest. Such incentives for a legal services
office could involve a funding source, such as a government agency or
foundation, which has a concrete stake in the outcome of the controversy, even though the funding source is not technically a client of the
legal services office. If the client arrayed on the other side of the controversy offers no comparable financial incentives, the incentives are
asymmetrical. For a legal services office operating on a tight budget,
this asymmetry triggers duty of loyalty concerns.
70. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. (1995) (discussing only
what this Article refers to as a kind of doctrinal conflict, in which a lawyer argues
inconsistent legal positions before the same appellate court).
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C. Attorney's Personal,as Opposed to Imputed, Conflict
Without asymmetrical financial incentives, a disqualifying conflict
can still arise if an acute mission or doctrine conflict is coupled with
advocacy on both sides of the controversy not just by the same office
or program, but by the same attorney. Imputed disqualification is not
called for in this setting, absent confidentiality concerns. The perceptions of clients and tribunals, however, can become unacceptably
skewed when the same attorney does work on both sides, prompting
internal and external queries, such as, "Which side are you on?"
D. Confidentiality Concerns
In some situations, for example, when lawyers for one client attend
group strategy sessions for other clients who are similarly-situated,
confidential information can be shared intentionally or inadvertently.
In these situations, even absent financial incentives and a personal, as
opposed to imputed, conflict on the part of the attorney, disqualification should be required unless in the imputed case the office has a
screening mechanism to deal with the issue.7 1 The following sections
apply this analysis to mission conflicts and doctrinal conflicts,
respectively.
IV.

MISSION CONFLICTS

This part applies the contextual approach to mission conflicts. It
first addresses the acuteness of the mission conflict. Next, it breaks
down two separate types of mission conflicts, financial and personal.
Finally, it discusses confidentiality issues.
A.

Acuteness of the Conflict

The inquiry about the acuteness of the conflict reflects the presumption of zero-sum results at the heart of present conflicts law. By zerosum, I mean that current conflicts doctrine generally views differences
within groups as fatal to shared legal representation.72 Under this
view, which both the monolithic and moralistic accounts of legal services implicitly accept, differences within groups necessarily means that
one must break up the group into smaller groups along the lines of
these differences. Otherwise, the zero-sum position goes, any gains
for one sub-group will inevitably come at the cost of losses for the
other sub-group.
71. For a useful discussion of confidentiality, see Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at
512-14.
72. See Simon, supra note 29, at 477-78; see also Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle,
Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of MaritalRepresentation,22 Seattle L. Rev.
97, 99 (1998) (examining the conflicts issues that arise when representing a married
couple in which one spouse gives decision-making authority to the other).
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This model assumes that representing individuals is the core situation of legal representation. 73 It then views with suspicion any situation, such as those involving shared representation, that departs from
the individualist model. The trouble here is that the zero-sum conception of individual versus group representation echoes the fallacies of
the monolithic view. Here, the zero-sum approach obscures differences within each individual and exaggerates differences between individuals and groups. In obscuring differences vithin individuals, the
zero-sum view takes individual preferences as fixed, neglecting the internal conflict, introspection, and learning that can change individual
preferences over time.74 At the same time, the zero-sum view obscures the positive effects of group conflict, which can make groups
more accountable and democratic, 75 refine shared objectives, and promote surfacing of new objectives as the context of disputes changes
over time.76 Both the monolithic and moralistic views rely on the

zero-sum formulation with regard to the issues addressed in this Article, and thereby lose some of the benefits of shared representation.
Each utilizes its own variation of the zero-sum approach to define
away the consequences of difference for shared representation.
This defining away is most obvious for the monolithic view. By exaggerating inter-group difference, the monolithic view sees landlords
of whatever socio-economic status as a different class and, by obscuring intra-group difference, sees tenants worried about violence and
drug trafficking as the landlord's unwitting allies against the authentic
interests of the poor. As a result, it declines representation to these
groups. The moralistic view does the reverse. By viewing landlords as
necessarily serving the interests of the poor, it obscures inter-group
differences, and as a result offers representation to landlords through
legal services offices or reimbursed private attorneys in a "judicare"
system. Because the moralistic view regards those tenants accused of
violent crime, drug-trafficking, and immigration offenses, and those
suffering from welfare "reform" measures as radically separate from
the "worthy" poor, it declines representation to this group through
statutory bars on representation by Legal Services Corporation
grantees.
A contextual view challenges the zero-sum perspective on conflicts
of interest. If one takes a positive-sum perspective, gains for one
group can expand the pie for everyone, at least in some situations.
Adopting this view will defuse many superficially acute conflicts and
73. See generally John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 825, 825-26 (1992) (expanding on this paradigm).

74. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 128-34 (1993).
75. See Simon, supra note 29, at 482.

76. Cf id. at 482-84 (noting that civil rights litigation can shift client attitude from
one of deference to authority and fear of resistance to one of solidarity against authority's overreaching).
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allow shared or common representation.7 7 The contextual view, with

its greater commitment to looking for positive-sum solutions, rejects
the denials of service required under the more rigid moralistic and
monolithic views. It recognizes that sometimes shared representation
is necessary, including representation by a single Legal Services program of groups whose interests at first might seem to be in acute conflict. This shared representation may be the only way to engage with
the multiplicity of interests in the community being served.
To illustrate the limitations of the zero-sum approach, consider the
case of Fiandacav. Cunningham,7 8 in which the First Circuit, finding a
client conflict, disqualified a legal services office from representing
both a class of female prisoners challenging inadequate conditions at a
correctional facility, and a class of persons with developmental disabilities challenging similarly inadequate conditions at a state school.7 9
The nub of the conflict in Fiandacawas that the state had sought to
settle the prisoners' lawsuit by offering them space on the campus of
the state school for persons with developmental disabilities. As the
court noted, the developmentally disabled class was adamantly op-

posed to sharing space with prisoners, who might in some cases be
dangerous.8 ° The court never seriously considered, however, whether

the prisoners also felt that this was an inadequate solution, or whether
the entire settlement offer was merely a state gambit to disqualify
counsel, which both groups should unite to resist. 8 Instead, the court
viewed the clients as having interests that were mutually exclusive,
82

devoid of a common stake in resisting state overreaching.

77. The case law indeed recognizes the possibility of such gains and the artificiality
of the zero-sum model when it limits application of conflicts doctrine in legal aid
settings to personal, not imputed, attorney conflicts. By declining to order vicarious
disqualification of an entire legal services or legal aid office because of the conflict
experienced by an individual attorney, the case law recognizes that common representation, at least on the legal office level, has benefits. Most obviously, these benefits
include promotion of legal access, which would be compromised if the client "conflicted out" had to seek out alternative sources of legal assistance. Courts also recognize that the lack of financial incentives to breach the duty of confidentiality
distinguishes the legal aid from the private firm setting. See United States v. Reynoso,
6 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
78. 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
79. See id. at 828-31.
80. Id. at 829.
81. See id. at 828-31.
82. Although the circumstances of the state's offer gave rise to a legitimate inference that the state was merely trying to get rid of obstinate counsel, even without any
reasonable likelihood that the court would approve the settlement they had offered,
the court insisted on a "smoking gun" on this point, which was not available. See id. at
830-31. For a recent decision that took a needlessly acute view of an entirely speculative conflict in a situation where the party moving for disqualification clearly had its
own agenda, see United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 663-64 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding the disqualification of a defense attorney who had previously gained an acquittal
for a co-defendant, where the government said it might call the co-defendant as a
witness on a factual point about which the co-defendant denied any knowledge).
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In contrast, the contextual approach's focus on such common stakes

permits a legal services office to represent the full multiplicity of the
community it serves. To find a common stake, the office would have
to determine that, on balance, the representation furthered the community's interest in social access-in developing viable institutions
that provide services and goods such as housing, consumer products,
or employment, or combating forces of social disorganization like
crime and drugs. The office would be obliged to decline representation in matters that reinforce either macro or micro barriers to capital
formation by exacerbating inequitable resource allocations or stereotypes that bolster subordinating images of groups.'
Representing multiplicity without acute mission conflicts is easiest
when the scope of the representation entails service work based
largely on the facts of the case, instead of impact or law reform work
raising issues of legal doctrine. Impact litigation can trigger doctrinal
conflicts, while representing one group largely in a service capacity
will minimize these dilemmas. For example, absent asymmetrical financial incentives, 8' no acute conflict would result from a legal services office representing a non-profit community group seeking to evict
a violent tenant, while also representing a tenant in another building
who asserts that he has been wrongfully accused of violent behavioras
The strength of this contextual inquiry is not that it avoids hard
choices, but rather that it confronts them. Representing a non-profit
83. Stereotypes have both a macro and micro dimension. They discourage more
equitable resource allocations and, as they are internalized by members of those
groups, make mobilization more difficult.
84. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
85. This range of clients reflects the contextual approach's commitment to representing the community in all its diversity. Because I argue that the landlord-as-client
situation requires a more contextual analysis, I disagree with Paul Tremblay's conclusion that such representation invariably creates a mission conflict. See Tremblay,
Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at 1125. The situation here may be closer to a
resource conflict, i.e., a claim that representing landlords is less of a priority for the
office than representing tenants. The resources conflict claim is in this setting clearly
a matter of office policy, not ethical requirements. More importantly, adopting such a
monolithic view ignores the situations where eviction of violent tenants serves the
interests of other tenants who bear the brunt of the violence. Tremblay in fact takes a
more contextual view of such tenant concerns when addressing the issue of under
what circumstances legal services offices should decline to represent tenants accused
of violence. See id at 1126 & n.91.
The same commitment to diversity, however, also mandates representation for tenants accused of violence or drug trafficking, where a significant possibility exists that
the charges are unfair or unfounded. Indeed, as I will discuss in the context of doctrinal conflicts, see infra Part V, a legal services office should even be permitted to represent a tenant accused of violence who challenges summary eviction procedures,
even though it has advocated for such procedures in a related case. A legal services
office should not be required to deny service to clients advocating either causetimely and certain eviction procedures for tenants victimizing others, or procedural
fairness for tenants so accused. Loyalty concerns, however, would bar the same attorney from personally taking both doctrinal positions. In addition, screening devices
would be necessary to allay confidentiality concerns.
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community group seeking to evict a violent or drug-trafficking tenant
would be appropriate under the standard articulated above, because it
would promote social access by restoring public space for mobilization, conversation, and play. Inequitable resource allocation and negative stereotypes, however, may have influenced the actions of the
tenants whose eviction the legal services office is seeking. If the legal
services office, in consultation with community representatives, determines that the welfare of the community outweighs these concerns,
the lawyers still should seek to mitigate the impact of eviction on the
tenants in question by seeking services and alternative housing for
them.86
86. Although advocating for eviction even in this narrowly circumscribed situation
serves social access goals, it should not be done without careful reflection about alternatives. Eviction profoundly disrupts the lives of tenants subject to this remedy, and
may jeopardize their health as well, if they are at risk of becoming homeless. Cf
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 575-97 (1992) (describing the
consequences of a lack of representation of tenants in eviction proceedings); Ann
Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731,
1740 (1993) (noting the profound impact of eviction on families). It may be helpful,
given this concern, to put the issue into perspective with analogies from legal services
practice.
The first analogy stems from the realm of resource conflicts. Legal services offices
tacitly accept evictions on an ongoing basis, as they resolve resource conflicts about
the most effective way to help a particular group, such as tenants, or to help other
groups clearly within the legal services mission. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. In what Paul Tremblay has aptly identified as a tragedy of legal services
practice, the limited nature of legal assistance makes difficult choices necessary. See
Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. Rev. 123, 132-42
(1992); cf. Paul R. Tremblay, PracticedMoral Activism, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 9, 28-42
(1995) (discussing ethical dilemmas in poverty law practice). A legal services office
might decide, for example, that some lawyers who might otherwise provide legal access to tenants in eviction proceedings instead assist in organizing rent strikes, or pursue impact litigation in the landlord-tenant arena, while other attorneys promote
social access by, for example, offering counsel on incorporating non-profits, or obtaining financing for micro-enterprises. Declining to make these choices brings us
back to the fictive formal equality of the common carrier model. In this sense, recognizing that the needs of the poor are not monolithic, and that tensions and tradeoffs
exist in low-income communities as well as elsewhere in society, is a necessary ingredient of a legal services strategy that aims to promote both legal and social access.
While one could argue that tacit acceptance of evictions is different from affirmatively seeking this remedy, even this argument does not wholly reflect legal services
practice. For example, when legal services lawyers represent survivors of domestic
violence in securing injunctive relief against batterers, they frequently ask judges to
order the abuser to leave the family residence. Cf Margulies, Representing Domestic
Violence Survivors, supra note 6, at 1085-92 (discussing approaches to lawyering for
survivors of domestic violence). Ordering the abuser to leave is not technically an
eviction. The consequences for the batterer, however, are the same. Legal services
lawyers will press for this relief when protecting the life and health of the survivor of
abuse renders it imperative. In cases involving eviction based on documented violence or a pattern of drug trafficking, danger to other tenants similarly is a compelling
rationale. Health and safety concerns also rebut the resource conflict argument that
eviction in cases of clearly-demonstrable violence or drug trafficking is simply not a
high enough priority to justify allocation of attorney time.
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Another difficult question involves the legal services office's position on income eligibility for public housing. Lawyers for the homeless helped change eligibility guidelines in the 1980s to reserve most
units for people with the least financial resources. From the standpoint of an individual applying for public housing, this position seems
to mitigate the impact of inequitable resource allocations. From a
community social access perspective, however, the changed policy was
problematic. It exacerbated economic segregation, depriving communities of buying power and children of role models in the market
sphere. Balancing these two perspectives, legal services offices could
argue for including economic integration as a factor in allocating new
and vacant units, while fighting attempts to evict the poorest tenants
or relocate them against their will.87
Under this standard, some decisions about representation would
trigger an acute mission conflict. Examples of cases which reinforce
the first barrier-inequitable resource allocations-include most evictions based on nonpayment of rent or consumer collection cases.Ys
87. In some cities, housing authorities are razing old public housing projects that
exacerbated racial and economic segregation. See Belluck, supra note 65. Legal services lawyers should not encounter an acute mission conflict in supporting such measures if they also insist on (1) workable and welcome housing options for displaced
tenants and (2) genuine economic integration, rather than gentrification, on
redeveloped public housing sites such as Cabrini-Green in Chicago, which are adjacent to highly valued commercial and residential properties. See Bennett, supra note
68, at 112-13 (noting the suspicions of Cabrini-Green residents that they are being
relocated to make way for more profitable development).
88. Conservative moralists, as well as their sometime allies in the law and economics movement, might question such distinctions. They might argue that a true conception of social access would contemplate taking the side of landlords and merchants all
of the time. On this reasoning, any nonpayment or default makes it more difficult for
the merchant or landlord to do business, and therefore incrementally reduces access
to housing or consumer goods. Some conservative non-profit law programs take comparable views, arguing, for example, that any environmental regulation harms business by raising costs and therefore adversely affects consumers.
There are three problems with this position. First, such a rationale completely ignores the tangible harm done to the environment without regulation, or the even
more immediate harm to a tenant or consumer who is evicted, has wages garnished,
or has a product repossessed. Second, like the view of the monolithic client espoused
by some progressive legal services advocates, it pays insufficient attention to the myriad textures of individual cases. Some kinds of regulation that purport to benefit consumers or tenants generally may have unintended untoward effects. However, the
exact nature and extent of such effects, if any, await a close investigation of the circumstances and context. In many situations, regulation may be salutary, promoting
consumer or tenant health and well-being with no effects on the supply of the good.
See Hirschman, supra note 19, at 40 ("[Tjhe bias favoring the perception of negative
side effects makes for a rush to judgment."). Hirschman offers the example of economists in the 1970s who argued that car safety measures, such as speed limits and seat
belts, would lead drivers to feel "invulnerable," and therefore to drive more aggressively, or pedestrians to feel that they need not be as vigilant of cars, as with a speed
limit the cars would be traveling in any case at a lower rate of speed. Id. at 40 n.*
(citing Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ.
677 (1975)). Hirschman notes that such dire forecasts were not realized. See id.; cf.
Simon, supra note 29, at 480 n.30 ("[T]he interests involved in suits seeking public
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For most tenants in non-payment eviction proceedings, lack of resources has fashioned a monthly menu of impossible choices, topped
by the question: Which goes first-food, clothing, or shelter?8 9 Examples of the cases which reinforce the second kind of barrier-invidious stereotypes-include representation of batterers in domestic
violence matters. In representing batterers, a lawyer will find it difficult to proceed without impeaching the survivor's credibility, through
lines of questioning that, for example, elicit information that abuse
supposedly occurred previously, and then ask why, if the abuse was so
severe, the survivor did not leave.9" The "why didn't she leave" ques-

tion inevitably buttresses images of women as either deceitful, passive,
or downright masochistic. These images, even in individual cases,
contribute to the micro structures of discourse and dominance which
sustain patriarchy. 9 In other situations, lawyers will often be able to
harmonize interests to avoid an acute conflict.
B.

Financialand PersonalInterests

Even when a conflict is not acute, tensions can arise. This section
addresses two factors which heighten those tensions: asymmetrical figoals such as environmental quality may seem to be more in conflict... because some
members of the putative class subscribe to mistaken factual beliefs-for example, that
a plaintiff victory may cause unemploymetit."). Third, the law and economics analysis
assumes that landlords or merchants in their pre-regulation state will necessarily
make decisions that serve social access goals, and that the social allocation of resources before regulation was just. The state of affairs pre-regulation may just as
easily be a state of nature, however, in which only a rigid Social Darwinist would
argue that tenants or consumers have a fighting chance to survive. Of course, this
Social Darwinist outlook is not a totally foreign perspective for conservatives. Cf
Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor 15 (1989) (discussing continuity in conservative thought on poverty).
89. See Nancy Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 565, 565-66 (1988-89).
90. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation,90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance
to Equality, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 477, 488-89 (1996).
91. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family,
and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 22 (1995) ("Dominant ideologies are subtly
and conclusively expressed and repressed in the very creation and recreation of social
norms and conventions .... A dominant ideology is transmitted through everyday

discourse-through language, symbols, and images as well as through the operations
of formal institutions and structures of power."); Winter, supra note 36, at 793-819
(discussing the Foucauldian conception of power).
Even in the case of batterers, however, a monolithic view can be self-defeating. In
the Immigration Clinic, which I co-direct, we represent a substantial number of survivors. Representing batterers would pose perhaps the greatest problems for the sense
of mission which I hold, along with my co-director, Linda Kelly. Yet, particularly
given Congress's punitive legislation on deporting any immigrant found to have committed domestic violence, ruling out representation would cast us in the monolithic
mold. Survivors might themselves view such extreme steps, such as deportation, as
punitive, and might wish some greater measure of control over such actions. See
Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refitge for Battered Immigrants in the
Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 665, 675-82 (1998).
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nancial incentives and personal, as opposed to imputed, conflicts of
interest.
1. Asymmetrical Financial Incentives
A lawyer's financial stake in keeping one client happy is a driving
force in conflicts of interest. If the legal services office receives substantial funding from a government agency or foundation identified
with a particular position, representing clients whose interests are perceived as inconsistent with that position will create tensions. If these
clients, like the typical legal services client, receive services free of
charge, asymmetrical financial incentives emerge. The lawyers taking
the less financially-favorable position, like lawyers in a comparable
situation in a private firm, may well come under some pressure to
smooth over their position to safeguard the office's funding. 92 In this
sense, funders of public interest work, although not technically clients
of the attorneys they support, can exert market power like that exerted by corporate clients of a law firm, who often explicitly or impliedly influence the law firm's pro bono case selection.93
While asymmetrical financial incentives are most troubling in the
doctrinal conflict setting, they can also create problems in the area of
mission conflicts. Consider a foundation concerned about violence in
public housing, which funds a legal services office to develop a legal
strategy for victimized tenants involving seeking injunctions like those
entered against batterers in domestic violence cases. When a legal
services office also represents tenants accused of violence or drug
dealing in eviction proceedings, funders may be puzzled by the seeming inconsistency.
Such tensions are troubling, but not necessarily dispositive. As
noted earlier, tension can be constructive, because it shakes up settled
assumptions and opens up new avenues for conversation and accord.
For tension to be constructive in the funding scenario, a legal services
office applying for funding would have to disclose up front its multiple
commitments in the community it serves, including both its commitment to combat violence and victimization and its commitment to assist tenants at risk of eviction because of unfair or unfounded
accusations. Funding received subsequent to such disclosure would
constitute acknowledgment of the legal services office's multiple roles.
2.

Personal or Imputed Attorney Conflict

This factor, whether it is the same attorney or merely the same law
office that is representing each group in a possible mission conflict,
reflects the distinct but not limitless loyalty which a client can expect
92. See Spaulding, supra note 4, at 1400-22.
93. Md at 1412-20. In private practice, moreover, non-client funding sources such
as insurers exert substantial control over the course of representation.
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from a lawyer. Generally, this factor is less important for mission conflicts than for doctrinal conflicts. This is true for two reasons. First,
cases that present mission conflicts do not place the lawyer's own
credibility on the line in the way that doctrinal conflicts do. Second,
barring the same lawyer from representing different groups in a possible mission conflict reduces legal access, by depriving all clients of the
valuable experience that lawyers acquire through representing a diverse range of clients. I discuss these points in turn.
In mission conflicts, cases turn on facts, for example, whether the
tenant engaged in violent acts that violated the terms of the lease.
Each case brings different facts. Therefore, an attorney's appearance
on behalf of a member of one group on one set of facts, and another
group on a different set of facts, says nothing about the merits of
either case. In theory, the attorney is transparent in this process, marshaling facts, not inventing them or testifying to them. As a result, the
attorney's personal credibility with the tribunal and with clients is not
directly relevant.94
A contrary result would deprive all clients of an important kind of
legal access. Obviously, one group is denied access completely, because the lawyer cannot represent them if she is representing another
group with interests that appear to be in tension. In addition, however, the legal access of the remaining pool of clients suffers, because
those clients are deprived of the experience that the lawyer would
have gained in representing the other side. Such experience will allow
the lawyer to more competently represent all clients, by informing her
assessment of her adversary's case, and giving her clients advice on
when to settle cases if the evidence is too strong. Of course, representing the "other side" is not the only way for lawyers to develop this
competence. It is, however, one valuable way, and the profession
should not bar it without a good reason. Confidentiality may furnish
such a justification in particular cases, as we see in the next subsection.
C. Confidentiality Issues
Confidentiality issues can trump all of these factors. In some cases,
the office may have to take measures to guard against disclosure of a
client's identity. For example, in domestic violence cases, if an office
wishes to represent both batterers and survivors, a risk arises that a
survivor's wish to take legal action against an abusive partner, which
she wishes to keep secret, will be disclosed if she encounters a friend
of her partner whom the office is defending against charges of spousal
abuse, and the friend tells the abusive partner. An office should represent both survivors and alleged abusers only if it addresses this is94. This is not to deny that, in practice, the reactions of a tribunal or fact-finder to
the attorney's personality have an impact. My only point here is that there is no
reason to suppose that the attorney's appearance in one case will prejudice his client
in the other.
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sue, through separate offices in separate locations, different intake
days, or other measures.
V.

DOCTRINAL CONFLICTS

Doctrinal conflicts are susceptible to analysis with the same factors
described above, although the dilemmas are sharper and involve more
trade-offs with client loyalty concerns. The client loyalty factor helps
explain, for example, the heightened role for questions about the
acuteness of the conflict and about whether the possible conflict is
personal to the attorney or merely imputed. These issues are explained below.
A. Acuteness of the Conflict
The acuteness factor becomes more salient in the area of doctrinal
conflicts. In the mission conflict sphere, our premise is that either one
or both of the cases evaluated for mission conflicts is a fact-based case,
with no novel legal issues. Generally then, neither case will have a
direct impact on the other. 95 The essence of the mission conflict is the
intuition that, even in the fact-based case such as an eviction based on
drug trafficking or violence, the respondent is a kind of virtual client
of the legal services office because of her residence in the community.
In contrast, doctrinal conflicts threaten harm to actual, as well as virtual clients. Because both kinds of clients are important to the legal
services mission, however, our view of the acuteness of a conflict
should still reject the presumption of a zero-sum game and look first
to mutually-advantageous solutions.
As an example of a doctrinal conflict which is not acute, consider a
legal services office that represents homeless people discharged from
public psychiatric institutions, who seek residences and services in the
community. Suppose that the office wishes to bring a suit to establish
a state obligation to provide such residences and services. At the
same time, the office is approached by representatives of a low-income community, which wants to argue that the state cannot site a
disproportionate number of facilities for the homeless in any one community, but must have every community support its "fair share" of
facilities. 96 The community is concerned that the state otherwise will
"dump" a disproportionate number of facilities on communities where
95. High profile cases, even those which turn exclusively on facts, can have a substantial impact. See Margulies, Identity on Trial,supra note 27, at 52-62. This impact,
while significant, is less direct and more diffuse. The possibility of impact even in
mission conflict cases is one reason that they are worth analyzing from a legal ethics
perspective, as this Article has tried to do. Analysis is even more important in a
doctrinal conflict case, where the impact is by definition more direct.
96. See Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Wirtue: Political Theory, Land
Use Policy, and the 'Not in My Backyard' Syndrome, 43 Syr. L Rev. 945. 966-68
(1992).
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political opposition will be less powerful, and where property values
are already low, allowing for the ready purchase of land. Under traditional "zero-sum" conceptions of conflicts law, these positions would
almost certainly be in conflict.
One could consider each of those positions in my hypothetical on
community housing, however, as complementary. The homeless clients are arguing for a general right to residences and services. They
are not necessarily arguing that the state should be able to discharge
its obligation free from community input. Indeed, one could argue
that facilities in which communities themselves feel that they have a
stake, and which communities feel are part of an obligation
shouldered equally by other communities, will have the greatest
chance of success.
While this interpretation defuses the conflict, a modification of the
facts in the hypothetical creates a conflict that is less amenable to reconciliation. Suppose that the community in its lawsuit to stop siting of
the group home went beyond the "fair share" argument, and instead
argued that the state in fact had no legal obligation to provide residences and services for discharged psychiatric patients. A victory by
the community on that doctrinal point would materially reduce the
options available for ex-patients in the community. This scenario enacts a zero-sum game, and therefore creates an acute conflict.97
One context we have considered throughout this Article, namely
the problem of tenants victimizing other tenants, can also precipitate
acute conflicts. Consider Spence v. Reeder,98 where a legal services
office, Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS), initially assisted a tenant who sought to challenge the summary eviction policy that GBLS
had helped draft on behalf of a plaintiff class of tenants settling an
earlier case on conditions in public housing.9 9 GBLS's representation
of the tenant risked an acute doctrinal conflict 0 0 in which it would
have had to argue, on behalf of the plaintiff class, that the summary
eviction procedure was legal, while it argued that the procedure was
illegal on behalf of the tenant facing eviction.
This situation was particularly serious because, in addition to a doctrinal conflict, it arguably created a client conflict and a mission conflict. One could readily view a lawyer's representation of a person
challenging an agreement, which a lawyer has helped draft on another
clients' behalf, as also embodying a client conflict. GBLS's drafting of
the agreement on summary evictions also amounted to a mission con97. Because a holding that the ex-patients were not entitled to placement and
services in the community would reduce the social access afforded this group, advocating for such a result would also constitute an acute mission conflict.
98. 416 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1981).
99. See Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1980).
100. The conflict was defused only by the tenant eventually obtaining substitute
counsel. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at 1141 n.142.
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flict, because a summary eviction process permits stereotypes, in the
form of unfounded or unfair accusations, to determine access to housing, a crucial social good.'
Advocates of the monolithic approach can cite the GBLS dilemma
as a warning about what happens when legal services offices try to
address differences in their tenant client base, instead of shaping their
mission around tenants' broad interest in fighting eviction (at least
their own) whenever possible. For the contextual approach, however,
positing such broad interests amounts to wishing away intra-group difference, not addressing it. The contextual approach to this mission
conflict addresses two distinct time periods: first, the period involving
drafting of the policy; and second, the period involving litigation challenges to the policy, once drafted.
In the drafting stage, the contextual approach would contemplate
legal services lawyers assisting in drafting a drugs-and-violence policy
that took adequate account of both perspectives-the standpoint of
tenants concerned about violence and the standpoint of tenants concerned wvith arbitrary and hasty eviction decisions. Most tenants
might, upon reflection, hold both values dear. A policy might, for example, satisfy concerns about timeliness by providing that a hearing
had to take place within a specified, relatively short time of the administrative eviction recommendation. In addition, devices like discovery,
which offer the potential for delay, could be streamlined. The respondent, however, would still receive a pre-eviction hearing. This kind of
harmonization of values, while not possible in every case, can occur
only if lawyers give inter-group difference its due.
Of course, this approach to the policy drafting stage does little to
ameliorate conflicts for a law office that has already drafted a policy
that seems skewed, and now must consider its role in a court challenge
to the policy. Here, as we have seen, an acute conflict exists. Nevertheless, the contextual approach would allow the legal services office
to represent both the majority of the tenant class, who support the
policy as drafted, and the tenant challenging it, if the office could satisfy the other criteria highlighted in the approach: no asymmetrical
financial incentives; no personal (as opposed to imputed) attorney
conflict; and no confidentiality concerns.'0 2 In addition, the legal serv101. Such stereotypes play a role in administrative eviction decisions. Cf. Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 (NV. Va. 1988) (reversing a decision upholding the eviction of a tenant who "allowed" herself to be beaten by her boyfriend).
102. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text; cf. Tremblay, Community-Based
Ethic, supra note 5, at 1140-41 (arguing against disqualification in the legal services
setting, even when positional conflicts exist); see also Federal Defenders of San Diego,
Inc. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding, in a case in which a federal public defender's office argued that it faced a conflict
of interest in challenging the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in individual cases because some of its clients benefitted from the Guidelines, that no conflict existed because arguments for the constitutionality of the Guidelines would be made by the
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ices office would have had to clearly disclose to both clients upon
commencement of the representation that such a conflict might occur.
This outcome addresses loyalty and confidentiality issues, while also
respecting intra-group differences. Justifying it requires a closer look
at the other criteria governing doctrinal conflicts under the contextual
approach.
B.

Financialand Personal Interests

This section examines specific factors that come into play in doctrinal conflicts. The two factors it discusses are financial incentives and
personal conflicts.
1. Asymmetrical Financial Incentives
Asymmetrical financial incentives, which may come into play with
mission conflicts, are even more important in the doctrinal conflict
arena because of their impact on loyalty. In the public housing tenant
victimization scenario, for example, a legal services office might apply
for funds from a government agency or foundation to develop an antiviolence strategy relying on enactment of a summary eviction procedure. If the office subsequently represented a tenant challenging that
procedure, funders might become quite confused. The tenant might
receive less vigorous representation because of concern that funding
organizations would terminate or deny financial support.1 03 Similar
Justice Department, not the Public Defender, and the number of clients who would
benefit from the Guidelines was so small that there was little danger of chilling the
ardor of indiviudual attorneys arguing that the Guidelines were unconstitutional);
Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 475 n.82 (discussing FederalDefenders).
103. This concern should also help shape decisions about representation by law
firms. A law firm which does employment work for corporations should be free to
take on pro bono employment work for employees. It should not argue both sides of
a legal issue, however, in the course of such representation. For example, a law firm
should not simultaneously argue in any forum on behalf of an employer that a single
incident cannot constitute a hostile environment under sexual harassment doctrine,
while arguing in any forum for an employee that a single incident can constitute a
hostile environment. Cf Spaulding, supra note 4, at 1422-31 (arguing for a narrow
interpretation of positional conflicts). Pressure from the employer could compromise
loyalty to the employee in the other case, particularly because the representation in
the pro bono matter was probably done largely by associates, wary of offending a
partner who might be heading the representation of the employer.
Having clients who are both employers and employees, while arguing only side of a
doctrinal issue, is more akin to a possible mission conflict. One can defuse such a
conflict here with the argument that a law firm representing an employee on such a
legal issue is well-equipped to counsel employers on how to create a sexual harassment policy that will obviate the need of such litigation. Barring representation in
such cases could pose inconsistencies with the lack of comprehensive ethical bars on
making legal arguments contrary to the prospective legal interests of former clients,
for example, when criminal defense attorneys become prosecutors, or vice versa. Rethinking the latter policy would gravely reduce legal access by preventing many clients
from retaining the attorney of their choice. It would also diminish the value of the
access available, by depriving attorneys of valuable experience and information.
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concerns might arise if the summary eviction procedure, agreed to as
part of a settlement of a lawsuit, was crucial to a court determination
that the office represented a "prevailing party" in the litigation, and
was thus entitled to a hefty award of attorney's fees.
2.

The Personal or Imputed Nature of the Attorney's Conflict

Even absent asymmetrical financial incentives, there are still significant loyalty concerns when the same attorney argues two sides of the
same legal issue for two different clients, albeit in two different cases.
These concerns, which involve the reactions of both tribunals and clients, do not apply to the same degree in cases where members of the
same law office, but not the same lawyer, argue each side. I discuss
the tribunal's reaction first, followed by analysis of the clients'
reaction.
A tribunal's reaction to a doctrinal conflict implicates the attorney's
duty of loyalty. A lawyer who appears before the same tribunal
within a short period of time, making inconsistent doctrinal arguments, runs the risk of confusing the tribunal. One client will likely
suffer, with attendant compromise to the duty of loyalty. The spectacle of the same lawyer arguing conflicting legal positions before the
same court within a short span of time could be disorienting, even to
judges trained to consider legal positions dispassionately. As merely
human creatures, judges will find it difficult to suppress musings about
which side the lawyer "sincerely" endorsed, as manifested by certain
aspects of the lawyer's brief or oral argument." This kind of inquiry
would inevitably work to the disadvantage of one client or cause.10 5
Absent financial incentives or confidentiality concerns, however, extending this concern to the lawyer's colleagues seems unduly restrictive. Courts cannot reasonably presume that a group of lawyers, in
private or non-profit practice, necessarily hold identical opinions.
Most private law firms do not "stand" for anything as entities, apart
from providing competent legal representation for a fee."m There is
no intrinsic reason why non-profit organizations, even though they
often have a stated mission, should be held to a monolithic account of
that mission by courts. Particularly because most legal services clients
have nowhere else to turn, such restrictions impinge severely on legal
access.
104. See Rosen, supra note 4, at 75.

105. This human confusion could also unduly distract judges from the merits of the
arguments, impairing the soundness of judicial decisionmaking as well as the duty of
loyalty to clients. Cf. Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 495-96 (discussing the effects of
doctrinal conflicts on the integrity of the justice system).
106. But see Spaulding, supra note 4, at 1422-25 (arguing that some firms view
themselves as having a "thick," rather than "thin," positional identity, tied to representing, for example, the timber industry or other interests).
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Clients should not feel any differently, at least if the law office puts
them on notice upon commencement of the representation that they
are entitled to the doctrinal allegiance of the lawyer or lawyers they
work with, but not to the doctrinal allegiance of all lawyers from that
office, or from other branch offices of the same legal services program. Historically, at least, client ties to lawyers have been personal
and affective in nature. 10 7 Corporate clients may try to purchase doctrinal or mission loyalty from law firms seeking their business. Such
exercises of market power create economic pressures, not ethical
imperatives.
C.

Confidentiality Concerns

Imputed attorney conflicts should, however, be sufficient to require
disqualification or withdrawal when they implicate confidentiality
concerns. Confidentiality concerns can readily transform a doctrinal
conflict into a client conflict. This can occur because it is quite likely
that the attorney handling each side, precisely because the legal issue
she is arguing has a significant impact, will participate in many meetings, email lists, and phone conferences with lawyers for third parties
who may be engaged in parallel litigation or advocacy efforts.' 08 Such
fora are ripe occasions for inadvertently disclosing confidential information. If the law office has a doctrinal conflict, i.e., is arguing the
other side of the legal issue in another case, it is quite possible that the
law office's adversary in that case is also a participant in such strategy
sessions.
To illustrate the potential for breaches of confidentiality, suppose,
for example, that one lawyer in a legal services office represents a
small residential treatment center for former drug abusers that wishes
to have the right to summarily evict suspected current drug abusers.
In a different case in the same court, other lawyers from the office
represent a resident of the drug facility. These lawyers want to argue
that community treatment facilities are the only alternative to the
street for residents, and therefore the drug facility should be viewed as
a mall or "company town" under state or federal constitutional law,
standing in the shoes of the government. Viewing the conduct of the
drug facility as "state action" would trigger a whole array of procedural and substantive protections for residents. The inadvertent disclosure of the theory at a strategy session for drug treatment
providers' attorneys, along with disclosure of the residents' lawyers'
107. See Kronman, supra note 74, at 128-34. But see Spaulding, supra note 4, at
1408-09 (arguing that corporate clients have expanded their conception of loyalty to
the level of the firm).
108. I have participated in many such meetings over the years, involving benefits,
disability, and immigration issues. "War stories" about individual clients-sometimes
with identifying information edited out, sometimes not-along with vigorous discussion of legal strategy, are a staple of such meetings.
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views about the strengths and weaknesses of the argument, would
constitute confidential information that could materially assist the
providers and injure the residents' legal prospects. °9 To guard against
this possibility, not only are personal conflicts to be avoided, but
screening devices are a necessity.
CONCLUSION

Addressing conflicts of interest is always difficult, and is particularly
wrenching in the legal services context. Legal services lawyers rightly
see themselves as embarked on a mission to enhance legal and social
access in the communities they serve. In a landscape already altered
by drastic federal restrictions and cutbacks, conflicts of interest make
this mission even harder to discern and fulfill. The complexity introduced by conflicts of interest can be viewed as tragedy or as challenge.
This Article chooses the latter course.
Meeting the challenge is important because of the flaws in current
approaches' treatment of the link between access and class difference.
We can divide access into legal access-access to a lawyer-and social
access-access to human and financial capital, goods, and services.
Legal access is always problematic in the poverty law setting, because
the need for legal assistance exceeds supply. Social access involves
the interaction of macro factors, including inequities in the allocation
of resources, and micro factors, including issues of social disorganization within low-income communities. Class difference, as I use the
term here, involves two kinds of diversity. Differences within a socioeconomic class are intra-group differences. Differences between rich,
poor, and middle-class people are inter-group differences. The dominant approaches to legal services-the common carrier, moralistic,
and monolithic approaches-each fail to address one or more of these
points.
Flaws in current approaches to the mission of legal services run the
ideological spectrum. The common carrier approach, sometimes promoted by conservatives, stresses legal access while rejecting enhanced
social access as a mission of legal services. As a result, the common
carrier approach leaves existing inequities in place, and merely dispenses an endless string of legal band-aids that fail to treat underlying
problems. Conservatives resort to a moralistic approach when they

find the common carrier approach inadequate for fulfilling their ideological agenda. The moralistic approach restricts legal access because
it deems certain groups, such as undocumented immigrants, tenants
accused of drug abuse, or welfare mothers, unworthy of representation. In the course of making such judgments of worth, the moralistic
approach exaggerates differences among low-income people, while ar109. Cf. Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 512-14 (discussing legal strategy as covered
by the duty of confidentiality).
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guing that formal equality of opportunity eliminates differences between the rich, poor, and middle-class.
The monolithic approach, which progressives press, inverts the moralistic approach. Its formulation of mission focuses on the macro dimension of social access, concerned with inequality of resources, but
leaves micro issues of social disorganization largely unaddressed. As a
result, the monolithic approach obscures intra-group differences, homogenizing low-income people into abstract entities like "tenants" or
"consumers" whose interests invariably diverge from affluent or middle-class people. Consequently, the monolithic approach effectively
denies legal access to some low-income people, like tenants victimized
by the violence or drug trafficking of other tenants, whose requests for
legal assistance trigger a mission conflict.
In contrast, the contextual approach acknowledges intra-group difference. Unlike the monolithic approach, it does not abstract intragroup difference out of existence. Unlike the moralistic view, it does
not magnify inter-group difference to justify a punitive approach to
the "unworthy" poor. This acknowledgment of difference allows the
contextual view to preserve the macro commitment to social access of
the monolithic view, address micro issues of social organization, and
provide legal assistance to clients, like tenants victimized by other tenants, for whom the monolithic approach lacks a ready category. The
contextual approach's treatment of positional conflicts reflects this
commitment to diversity, as well as both continuity and change in the
landscape of legal services. It honors the notion of mission, which
progressives have envisioned for poverty lawyers, by examining mission conflicts with the same care that the profession devotes to conflicting advocacy about legal doctrine. To accomplish these goals, it
considers a number of factors, including the acuteness of the conflict,
asymmetrical financial incentives, the personal or imputed nature of
the attorney's conflict, and confidentiality issues.
Consistent with the contextual approach, legal services attorneys
should engage actively with the diverse interests of the community
they serve, instead of shutting out difference through finding mission
or doctrinal conflicts. This engaged posture permits representation on
legal and factual issues of both tenants victimized by other tenants'
violence and tenants accused of violence seeking procedural fairness.
The commitment to diversity tracks legal services' historical concern
with all community members as at least virtual clients. Tempering this
commitment are concerns about confidentiality; harm to credibility
before tribunals and clients that is posed by personal, if not imputed,
attorney conflicts; and financial pressures on the duty of loyalty, which
come with legal services' increasing reliance on a patchwork quilt of
funding sources. Addressing these factors as part of a contextual approach will protect legal services offices' pursuit of legal and social
access for the multiple communities they serve.

